Issue 30: The Day After The Ceasefire
What comes next for Israel and the Palestinians after the latest episode of violence?
As of 2 a.m. this morning, a ceasefire has been put into effect, bringing to conclusion this recent escalation between Israel and Hamas. For eleven days, rockets from Gaza rained down on southern and central Israel. For eleven days, the Israeli military targeted Hamas and Islamic Jihad military infrastructure and personnel. In the process, Israeli and Palestinian civilians were killed.
Typical to these exchanges, both Hamas and Israel will declare victory (there were celebrations across East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza last night). But there are no real winners here. And there is no military solution to the conflict, even as it pertains to Hamas.
When the adrenaline eventually wears off, a more sober assessment is required, one that not only examines the reasons why this episode occurred (last week’s newsletter dealt with this at length) and whether it could have been avoided (there are compelling arguments for and against), but also maps out what should be done going forward.
But in order to tackle this question, one must first identify what exactly needs to be addressed.
This round of violence was triggered by developments in Jerusalem - both the exchanges between police and East Jerusalem Palestinians in Sheikh Jarrah as well as around Damascus Gate and the Al Aqsa compound / Temple Mount. Hamas made a calculated decision to exploit these tensions, and in the process redirected attention away from Jerusalem. But don’t be confused, Hamas rocket fire did nothing to solve the deep frustrations held by East Jerusalemites towards both Palestinian leadership and the State of Israel. Without addressing the inherent conflict of interests in East Jerusalem, you are ignoring the core of the conflict and setting the stage for future tensions.
Gaza requires a different set of tools. Since Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, it has posed a continued security challenge to Israel and undermined the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority. Despite blockades and successive military operations, the terror organization’s military capacity has only evolved and improved over time (cleverly illustrated by Jordanian cartoonist Mahmoud Rifai below). But Hamas doesn’t pose an existential threat, so should Israel maintain its current policies - knowing that it continues to possess a qualitative military edge and can endure these episodes? Could alterations to its current policies have a positive impact and weaken Hamas’ influence? How can Israel’s partners - who from my perspective offered Israel significant public support - play a role in finding political solutions?
Jerusalem and Gaza are priorities, but just because the West Bank was comparatively quiet over the last month doesn’t mean that it can be ignored. After all, we are only a year removed from Israel’s government considering the annexation of territories within the West Bank. And the questions surrounding the future of the Palestinian Authority after President Mahmoud Abbas haven’t gone away. His decision to call off national elections this summer contributed to Hamas’ decision to strike Israel. What can be done to facilitate the peaceful transfer of power in the post-Abbas era? Is it important that this process be democratic? If so, who should be permitted to vote and who should be permitted to run? How can constructive partners in the West Bank be empowered by Israel and the international community?
Finally, and as I reiterated in last week’s newsletter, there are the dynamics between Jews and Arabs within Israel. How can these wounds be mended? Who are the partners required to form a new social contract? How can you utilize democratic institutions to address the structural inequalities within Israeli society (this question doesn’t only apply to Arabs, but to most of Israel’s minority communities)? Israel’s Arab population - many if not most of whom self-identify as also being Palestinian - is a party to the conflict and also can be a part of finding solutions.
In sum, there are multiple challenges that need to be addressed. Individually, each possesses its own unique set of conditions and policy prescriptions. But they are each a part of a greater web of dynamics between Jews and Arabs / Israelis and Palestinians in this land. Finding solutions to one challenge isn’t sufficient, nor is there a silver bullet that resolves them all at once. It requires a proactive, coordinated effort at the national, local, and grassroots levels over the course of decades.
I had the privilege this week to discuss the situation with both Israeli and Palestinian social activists and policy experts. Many I’ve known for a while, but I also heard new voices with different perspectives. These were difficult conversations. There are still people who want to engage in dialogue, want to share their worldview and listen to the other side, and I have to believe eventually want to work on solving these problems. However, many Palestinians readily admitted that their children - the new generation whose voice rang out over the last few weeks - no longer believe in a two state solution. Polling data indicates that this is happening within Israeli society as well.
So while it is easy for me to say that I believe most Israelis and Palestinians want peace, I also know that the majority don’t believe that peace is currently achievable under the current circumstances and don’t necessarily want to put in the individual effort to reach that goal. Violence forced the conflict back into Israeli public discourse, but as the ceasefire endures the familiar tropes of, “We managed the situation pretty well,” and, “There is no one to talk to on the other side,” and, “Better the status quo than the alternative,” will inevitably return. The wounds will calcify on the surface, and people will forget their own pains just long enough to be surprised when war rears its ugly head once more.
Change is the one constant in life. The only way to ensure that change is for the better is by accepting our own agency and asking what we can do, as individuals and as a society, to reverse the cycle of violence.
As always, I want to feature several pieces that offer different perspectives on this week’s subject. This is not an endorsement of the perspective, rather an endorsement of reading and thinking about the points raised by the author. Without consuming a diverse array of content and contemplating its value, it is difficult to see the world with different eyes.
Nasreen Haddad Haj-Yahya, Director of the Arab Society in Israel program at the Israel Democracy Institute, addresses some of the ways that Israel can address the tensions in the country’s mixed cities, where Jews and Arabs have for decades lived side by side.
Both Michael Koplow, Policy Director at the Israeli Policy Forum, and Hussein Ibish, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, wrote columns this week about the steps that need to be taken to avoid the next Israel-Hamas war and the future role of external actors, like the United States, in keeping the peace (and maybe advancing peace). Read them here and here.
Khalil Shikaki is the Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and one of the most recognized experts on Palestinian public opinion. In his recent Foreign Affairs piece he writes, “How will the current confrontation affect the prospects for a long-term peace? On the Israeli-Palestinian front, the two-state solution might have received a mortal blow.” Continue reading in order to understand a Palestinian perspective on what the coming months may bring.
I hope you found this week’s content valuable.
-Gabi