Issue 45: Ukraine's Ripples in the Middle East
As tensions build in Eastern Europe, Middle Eastern states hedge their bets
The world’s attention is fixation on the pressure building along the Ukraine-Russia border, and as that tension grows the strain threatens not only regional stability but international security as well. Unsurprisingly, those early ripples from the border have already reached the Middle East, where many actors are trying to hedge between Moscow, Kyiv, and Washington DC.
I want this week’s newsletter to focus on the pieces I’ve collected, so my comments will be brief and to the point. By and large, Middle Eastern states seek to stay neutral in this dispute. There are a number of reasons for this:
For countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others, the ongoing negotiations in Vienna about the restoration of the JCPOA (or Iran Deal) supersede the territorial and historical dispute between Ukraine and Russia. Russian participation in the Vienna talks is essential to their possible success, and an external distraction that disrupts the consensus between the great powers could negatively impact the outcome of those negotiations. Many believe that could be disastrous for the region. This explains why Senator Lindsay Graham told reporters in Jerusalem this week, “Russia and Ukraine are important, but this [preventing a nuclear Iran] is the game-changer of all game-changers.” Moscow knows this, and is leveraging nuclear angst against Ukraine and its allies.
I’ve written a fair bit about the US withdrawal from the region since the start of Invisible Boundaries. One of the clearest consequences of this withdrawal, partial though it may be, has been Russia’s expanded role in the region. Russia has always been an important outside player in modern Middle Eastern history, but its growing influence and military presence - filling the vacuum left behind by the US - has compelled everyone in the region to recalibrate their strategies. It is more difficult for Middle Eastern states to take sides against Russia today than it has been at any point since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that reality is unlikely to change in the near future.
No one should expect Middle Eastern states to back up American or Western policies at the moment so long as NATO and its allies lack a common vision for how to deescalate tensions along the Ukraine-Russia border or to respond in the event of a future escalation of hostilities.
There are any number of reasons why Middle Eastern states are hedging their bets and hoping that the Ukraine-Russia crisis doesn’t escalate. But this isn’t because they don’t care. Quite the contrary.
Here are some recent pieces that touch on the themes I’ve addressed above:
Let’s start with big picture understandings of the situation and then focus more narrowly on various topics. That means highlighting pieces that address the Ukraine-Russia dispute’s impact on Middle Eastern states on a broader scale and later tackling the perspectives of individual states. For big picture, I suggest chewing on “The Price of Retrenchment,” by former US ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, and this composition of regional experts positions by the European Council on Foreign Affairs. Deutsche Welle also put together a solid review that touches upon the core interests that influence different Middle Eastern state’s policies towards the brewing conflict.
But if we want to narrow our focus to a few specific countries, I would start with Saudi Arabia. Check out Javier Blais’ analysis that argues, “The kingdom is using the Ukraine-Russia tension to re-establish itself not only in energy markets but global politics,” as well as this Wall Street Journal article that explains why Saudi Arabia, “is sticking with Russia.”
Turkey is another country that is keenly interested and impacted by in Ukraine-Russia dispute. Unlike other Middle Eastern states, Turkey is a NATO member and is geographically much closer to the potential conflict zone. Just to add more nuance to this picture, Turkey is a major consumer of Russian natural gas and a sells unmanned drones to Ukraine. There are a number of strong pieces that address Turkey’s outlook, including Erin O’Brien’s piece in Foreign Policy, Amberin Zaman’s report on Ankara’s drone sales to Kyiv, and former US ambassador to Turkey James F. Jeffery’s latest for Wilson Center.
Last but not least, let’s talk about Israel. Although it is one of Washington’s closest Middle Eastern allies, Israel is also walking a fine line between its relations with the US, Ukraine, and Russia and since 2014 has adopted a neutral position towards the Ukraine-Russia dispute. Similar to its neighbors, Israel wishes this problem would just go away because there are other, more pressing issues - notably the Iran nuclear talks in Vienna. But as much as Israel would like to be like Dorothy, click its heels, and be somewhere else, it cannot escape the stresses of this conflict. There are approximately 10,000 Israeli citizens currently in Ukraine, and the heightened anxiety around evacuating such a large population prompted the Director General of Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reportedly ask Russia for its assistance in the event it invades Ukraine. This triggered a diplomatic storm between Jerusalem and Kyiv. It has also been reported this week that in the summer of 2021 Israel refused a Ukrainian request to purchase its Iron Dome missile defense system out of concern that it would upset Moscow. To understand more about Israel’s calculus, I suggest reading Daniel Brumberg’s piece in Responsible Statecraft, and watching former Israeli Member of Knesset Ksenia Svetlova’s enlightening talk for the Jerusalem Press Club:
I hope you find this week’s content engaging. Take the time to read through the various pieces I’ve chosen to share, and feel free to share this newsletter with others.
Gabi