Issue 48: Unpacking the Herzog-Erdoğan Summit
Israel and Turkey want to restore diplomatic ties, but what is driving them to do it now?
President Isaac Herzog visited Ankara this week for a historic summit with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As many noted, it was the first high-level visit by an Israeli official to Turkey since 2008, just before bilateral relations began an unexpectedly public and rapid descent. In the 1990s, the Israel-Turkey partnership was often dubbed a “love affair”, so when I saw Herzog’s arrival amidst a snow flurry it reminded me of a fairly common Turkish expression:
Kışın derinliğinde güneşin çiçeği özlediği gibi, Ben de seni özlüyorum.
I miss you like the sun misses a flower in winter
I asked myself, “are we witnessing the rekindling of an old flame? What is actually going on here and why is it happening now after past efforts fell short of their goals?”
There are a number of factors at play. The Turkish economy is in tatters, and with presidential elections scheduled for June 2023 (the same year as the Republic’s centennial) Erdoğan is trying to find every possible means to save a sinking ship in order to secure his reelection. Erdoğan’s ascent to the pinnacle of Turkish politics was aided by country’s rapid economic growth in the 2000s and 2010s, and there are many who believe that a prolonged recession could spell the end of his political career (as difficult as that may to believe).
Over the last year (and arguably since the Biden election victory), Turkey has engaged in a courtship of Israel and other regional actors in the hopes that a foreign policy shift will both distract the Turkish public from daily economic struggles and produce trade opportunities that can help buoy Erdoğan’s polling numbers before election day. In November 2021, Turkey successfully normalized diplomatic ties with the United Arab Emirates and with it a $10 billion Emirati investment fund in the Turkish economy was established. Although Turkish culture is usually seen as high-context, where communication is often less explicit and direct, Erdoğan did little to hide Turkey’s economic interests in normalization relations with Israel this week.
But following Herzog’s visit, it remains unclear what Israel wants out of normalization with Turkey at the present moment. Sure, reestablishing ties with Turkey is Israel’s strategic interest. I’ve worked on this subject for well over a decade, bringing Israeli and Turkish policymakers together to discuss regional and bilateral issues. I can cite chapter and verse of why relations collapsed around 2009-2010 and why they should be renewed. But what does Israel’s current government hope to accomplish by normalizing diplomatic relations with Turkey now? Herzog is a ceremonial figure, even if he had a robust political career and comes from a distinguished family. He does not hold executive authority like Erdoğan. So his visit to Ankara, while significant, demonstrates that Israel - or Bennett - wants to test the temperature in Ankara before wading into deeper waters. Herzog’s visit can only be a stepping stone that enables a more meaningful set of conversations between Israeli and Turkish officials down the road. Some of those conversations are already in the works, but a visit to Jerusalem by President Erdoğan and a face-to-face with PM Naftali Bennett and FM Yair Lapid (scheduled to be PM next in the government’s rotation) would signal a real shift.
Unlike Erdogan, Herzog’s press conference statements didn’t double down on the “it’s the economy, stupid”. Instead he spoke broadly about themes such as Israel and Turkey’s shared history, interfaith relations, and the need for a new era of mutual respect. In other words, Erdoğan and Herzog stood in the room together, and shook hands, but they sent very different messages to their respective domestic audiences: Erdoğan sought to remind Turks that normalization with Israel is part of a broader effort to rehabilitate the economy and won’t come at the expense of the Palestinian cause, and Herzog tried to connect his visit to Ankara with Israel’s other foreign policy achievements in recent years, most notably the Abraham Accords. What matters more is the messages they exchanged behind closed doors. If Erdoğan’s position remains transactional, focused only on short-term economic gains, that may increase the likelihood that Israeli government asks for something more tangible in exchange, perhaps widely discussed removal of senior Hamas officials from Turkey.
It also remains fuzzy why Israel is pursuing this now. After enduring 12 years of dysfunctional relations with Ankara, Israel has managed to piece together a network of relationships with other countries that - although not a replacement of Turkey - support its regional interests. That includes countries like Greece, Cyprus, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt (to name a few). The common thread is that they aren’t the biggest fans of Erdogan either, so what is the incentive to support his reelection campaign at this particularly vulnerable moment and how can that happen without upsetting Israel’s new partners? Should the opportunity to reset diplomatic ties be seized regardless of who is the head of state? What are the other incentives pushing Israel to consider normalization of relations? What factor does the European energy crisis and Israel’s decade-long pursuit of export routes for its natural gas play a role?
The elephant in the room that Herzog mentioned briefly is the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Though Israel and Turkey have many reasons to normalize diplomatic ties with one another, war in Europe could prove to be a far greater incentive for cooperation than anything else. Russia’s invasion is already testing Israeli and Turkish strategic interests, and while both countries have tried to hedge between their support for Ukraine (and the West) and their necessity to cooperate with Russia, they may be forced to change their approach before it is all said and done. Cooperation between Jerusalem and Ankara may be a way for both sides to alleviate the individual stress of dealing with Moscow in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean alone.
The Herzog-Erdoğan meeting raised more questions than answers, as these summits often do. Turkey’s obviously signaling that it seeks a new chapter in relations with Israel has placed the ball squarely in Israel’s court. Now Israel’s leadership team must determine what that chapter should look like and what components - economic, energy, security, tourism, climate change, etc - should be a part of reframing this relationship in the coming decade. With Turkish presidential elections fast approaching however, the window of opportunity may be closing fast.
As many of my readers know, Israel-Turkey relations is one of my primary areas of academic and professional expertise, so it was a busy week with some media appearances for Israeli networks (WARNING! shameless plug time!) that I thoroughly enjoyed.
The Herzog-Erdogan summit received quite a bit of local coverage, a reflection of how the Israeli media often views foreign policy issues and relations with Turkey in particular. It was a welcome surprise after several years in which attention to developments in Turkey had waned, and attitudes had become increasingly pessimistic about the prospects of normalization. As I told several networks, the visit was an important first step. But there is a lot of hard work left to go.
Here are some pieces worth checking out:
Atlantic Council in Turkey collected several expert opinions on the state of Israel-Turkey relations in order to contextualize Herzog’s visit, and I was honored that they asked me to share my thoughts alongside those of Brenda Shaffer, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and Karel Valansi, a political columnist for T24 and Şalom in Turkey. I also offered my two cents in Kristina Jovanovski’s report on the summit for The Media Line.
Financial Times reporter Laura Pitel crafted an excellent piece on the Turkish economy and Erdogan’s efforts to stave off recession.
Soli Özel, professor of International Relations at Kadir Has University in Istanbul, authored a fascinating piece on the role of populism in Turkish politics and the possible end of the Erdogan era for Institute Montaigne.
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-Gabi