Issue 53: Biden in the Middle East
POTUS' much-hyped visit was predictable, but was it effective?
As a Jerusalem resident, there are times when you feel like you live at the edge of the world. During the pandemic this feeling was intensified by frequent lockdowns and airport closures.
However, there are other times when Jerusalem feels like the world’s axis. Some of those moments are seasonal, such as the annual passage of major pilgrimage holidays for the three major monotheistic faiths. But others are less predictable, and have the capacity to be equal parts inspiring and disruptive. Such as US presidential visits…
If I was to guess, you’ve probably consumed plenty of content on Biden’s trip to the Middle East, either through articles summarizing POTUS’ days in the Holy Land or social media images capturing the most talked about moments. Here are a few of my thoughts:
Biden’s visit to Jerusalem was about making an emotional connection, and he crushed it. There may never be a US president with a deeper, more personal relationship with Israel than Joe Biden. While I watched the various components to his visit, how he transformed a pro forma stop at Yad Vashem into a tearful moment between Holocaust survivors and the Commander in Chief, how transparently he spoke to the Israeli press about the importance of bilateral relations and the limits of American power, how he worked the crowd at the 21st Maccabiah Games, and how he - for the first time in his presidency - verbalized a continued US commitment to the two-state solution and for Palestinian national aspirations, I couldn’t help but recognize how Biden’s demeanor differed from his predecessors, Donald Trump and Barack Obama. He was in his element, comfortable both with his surroundings and his hosts, and exuded a restrained, knowing confidence.
This is not to say that Biden’s visit didn’t expose some of the continued policy differences between Israel and the US, most notably on how to address the Iranian threat. However, just as this visit was important for Biden, it was equally important for Prime Minister Yair Lapid. Operating as a caretaker during an election cycle, Lapid’s goal was to demonstrate his bonafides with POTUS, and to show the Israeli electorate that cooperative US-Israel relations are not solely dependent on Benjamin Netanyahu. As a result, public differences were kept at a minimum. And considering that Israeli social media spent more time debating the merits of an Israeli pop star who, for religious reasons, refused to shake Biden’s hand, I’d say Biden’s visit to Jerusalem went off without a hitch. As Alon Pinkas succinctly summarized in Ha’aretz, Biden came to restore trust and stabilize the US-Israel relationship: predictable, boring, effective.
In contrast to his celebratory visit to Jerusalem, the 2nd-leg in Jeddah presented Biden with a more challenging climb. US-Saudi relations are far more transactional than those with Israel, and the personal animus between Biden and Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman was front and center this weekend. Each facial expression was analyzed again and again, to the point in which it was easy to lose track of the actual policy discussions being held and what purpose of Biden’s visit was. It can be argued that the tête-à-tête was the only reason for Biden’s stop in Jeddah (although I’d counter that his attendance at the GCC+3 summit, and meetings with Arab leaders such as UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed and King Abdullah II of Jordan were also significant). The US needs Saudi Arabia to increase the flow of oil to as the slow the pace of recession and elevate pains being felt at the pump. The price was Biden sacrificing his moral position by agreed to meet with Bin Salman, who is believed to have ordered the murder of Saudi-American journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.
Very significant, MBS received all the Arab leaders in person at the airport, and gave a very warm welcome to them. With Biden, things were completely different, no airport reception, cold welcome, and a “tit for tat” behavior.
Unsurprisingly, Bin Salman denied responsibility for Khashoggi’s death. What fascinated me was how he held a mirror up to the US president, reportedly pointing out past American sins of Abu Ghraib and how the Biden administration has handled the killing of Palestinian American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi foreign minister, told reporters that incidents like Khashoggi’s murder “…are issues, mistakes that happen in any country, including the US. The Crown Prince pointed out that the US has made its own mistakes and has taken the necessary action to hold those responsible accountable and address these mistakes just as the kingdom has.”
I will leave experts on US-Saudi relations to weigh in on whether this kind of direct language towards POTUS is atypical or par for the course. I felt the game of moral jousting with the US was largely made possible by former President Donald Trump. When I read Bin Salman’s reported comments, I couldn’t help but remember Trump’s 2017 interview with Bill O’Reilly during which he said, “There are a lot of killers. You think our country's so innocent?”
One of Biden’s foreign policy goals in the post-Trump era was to reassert US moral leadership in the international community - is that possible under the current circumstances? Much like the tale of the Little Dutch Boy, the US and her allies managed to take the correct position in Ukraine. Nevertheless, as the conflict with Russia deepens, and in the process disrupts the global economy, Western leaders will be compelled to make a series of moral and ethical tradeoffs in order to ensure that oil and gas supplies continue to flow and their economies remain stable as they try to defeat Putin. I don’t think most Republican presidents would operate any differently. These are the sacrifices that come with living in a flawed, unbalanced world.
Israel-Saudi relations entered a new chapter. On July 14, Israel reportedly approved an arrangement that would permit Egypt to transfer sovereignty of the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia. Hours later, Saudi Arabia released a statement indicating that it will open its airspace to Israeli flights to the Far East, as well as develop direct flights between Israel and Saudi Arabia for Muslim pilgrims.
בשתיים בלילה זה קורה - רשות התעופה האזרחית הסעודית מכריזה שתאפשר לכל חברות התעופה האזרחית לעבור במרחב האווירי הסעודי מבלי לציין את ישראל אבל זה האירוע. ככה גם היה אחרי הנרמול עם האמירויות
These two issues have been discussed at length over the years, as Israeli and Saudi strategic interests increasingly aligned and the parties sought to take small steps towards normalization.
Saudi officials reiterated during Biden’s visit that opening the country’s airspace had “nothing to do with diplomatic ties with Israel” and that normalization was not on the horizon. For full diplomatic ties to be established, Climate Envoy Adel Al-Jubeir told CNBC, the two-state solution must be realized. (Biden reiterated his commitment to the two-state solution, although also commented the “ground isn’t ripe” for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.)
The truth probably lies in between the optimism of Israeli and US officials and denial of Saudi officials. Israel and Saudi Arabia are in dialogue with one another, and the forces pushing the sides together (US withdrawal, Iran) aren’t going to magically disappear in the coming years. At the same time, Israel hasn’t delivered a diplomatic response to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, a proposal that both Saudi officials and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas mentioned this week. Israeli-Saudi cooperation may expand, but “going public” may be dependent on Israel’s willingness to enter negotiations with the PA and reach a resolution to the conflict.
Sometimes the most important elements of a presidential visit are the components that get overshadowed by greater media narratives. For me, several items remain worthy of conversation.
The first is that the joint statement between Biden and King Abdullah II referenced “including the Palestinians in regional cooperation projects” - an indirect nod to the Abraham Accords and the Israel-Jordan water-solar deal. The question of Palestinian participation is an important one, and divisive in Israeli circles. I certainly believe that finding ways of incorporating the Palestinian Authority in regional processes would be difficult, but the reward would be raising the ceiling for what is possible at the regional level and in the process building confidence between Israeli and Palestinian officials who don’t interact with one another nearly as much as they ought to.
Second, in the ongoing regional dispute with Iran there are actors - like the UAE - who are hedging their bets. While Lapid publicly pushed Biden to get tough on Iran, UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash implied that his country was considering de-escalation and normalizing diplomatic ties with Tehran. From a certain perspective, this is a continuation of business as usual. The UAE is one of Iran’s most important trade partners and is positioning itself as a potential broker between the Islamic Republic and the Gulf states as nuclear talks continue to lag. But it is once again a reminder that - in international diplomacy and in particular in the Middle East - actions speak louder than words.
Lastly, I want to try your attention to the US-led I2U2 forum (India, Israel, UAE, US) that met virtually during Biden’s visit in Jerusalem. In an increasingly interconnected and global world, I2U2 demonstrates the potential for collaboration between states that operate in distinct geopolitical spaces yet recognize that a combination of shared interests, opportunities, and existing connective tissue encourages a more formalized diplomatic approach. If coordinated effectively, the I2U2 forum could potentially bridge the Indian subcontinent to the West via the Middle East and Mediterranean in arguably the most meaningful way in 80 years, and connect distinct US-led strategic partnerships around the world (I’m thinking both the Quad, NATO, and increasing cooperation between India, UAE, Israel and other Mediterranean states).
I hope you find this edition’s content engaging. Please feel free share this newsletter with others.
-Gabi