
One of the most overused refrains in Middle Eastern geopolitics is that Iran plays chess while “INSERT COUNTRY HERE” plays checkers. The phrase has been echoed by figures ranging from Thomas Friedman and General David Petraeus to former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy — not to mention dozens, if not hundreds, of journalists, analysts, and policymakers. The underlying message is consistent: the Islamic Republic of Iran is portrayed as a master of strategic patience — cultivating proxy networks, slowly expanding its military capabilities, and using carefully timed diplomacy to outmaneuver international efforts to curb its regional ambitions and nuclear program — while other actors, including the United States, react tactically and without long-term vision.
I hesitate to lean too heavily on the chess metaphor, but events this past week compel me to at least entertain it for a moment. Israel’s air force systematically dismantled Iranian air defenses, eliminated dozens of senior IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists, destroyed key infrastructure, and reportedly disabled nearly two-thirds of Iran’s missile launchers. Oh, and Washington is positioning the US military for possible intervention. Iranian leadership, lauded for for its strategic patience for decades, is now on the back foot. Which begs the question: are we heading towards checkmate? (From the Persian māt — “the Shah is dead.”)
To answer that, we must first ask: what were Israel’s objectives when it launched its preemptive strike on Iran?
Within hours of the first wave of attacks, Israeli officials presented their case: new intelligence indicated that Iranian scientists had begun weaponizing enriched nuclear material, requiring immediate action. But as the operation expanded — with targets extending beyond military and nuclear facilities — Israeli messaging shifted. Officials began to reference a broader goal: destabilizing the Iranian regime itself.
Why does that distinction matter?
Despite achieving air superiority and inflicting serious damage to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, Israel’s campaign has limitations. The Fordow enrichment facility — buried deep beneath a mountain — remains beyond the reach of the Israeli air force. This is why Israel hopes the United States will step in to finish the job.
But then Donald Trump entered the picture, announcing that he would take up to two weeks to determine the appropriate response. In that moment, Israel moved from the driver’s seat to the passenger seat. It now faces the delicate task of continuing its aerial campaign while avoiding mission creep (incremental expansion of military intervention beyond its original scope) which — so long as the US is in negotiations with the Islamic Republic officials —probably includes regime change.
Americans are wary of further entanglement in the Middle East. Many members of the Trump administration are veterans of past wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And while Israel may be able to further weaken the Iranian regime institutions, it does not have the capacity to control what comes next. History suggests the U.S. doesn't either.
Therefore, if Israel can successfully align its strategic goals with both the White House and the American public, it stands a better chance of securing decisive U.S. support — militarily or diplomatically — to end Iran’s nuclear threat.
I don’t know what comes next — neither does anyone else. What is clear, however, is that Israel’s military accomplishments this week are both unprecedented and historic. Yet how they are remembered will depend entirely on what comes next. As I argued earlier this week, the true measure of this moment will be whether Israel, the United States, and other like-minded actors in the region can translate battlefield success into a durable resolution — one that brings an end to the war, from Iran to Gaza, and lays the groundwork for lasting peace and security for all.
Three pieces this week that everyone should read/watch/listen:
Who understands the methods and risks of taking out another country’s nuclear facilities better than someone who did it themselves? I highly encourage this conversation between Dmitri Alperovitch and Gen. Amos Yadlin (ret.), former Head of Israel’s Military Intelligence:
Speaking of expertise, The Atlantic’s David Frum sat down with Karim Sadjadpour, one of the top experts on Iran:
Finally, I recommend Sohrab Ahmari’s Unherd piece on the risks of regime change in Iran. The conservative camp in the US appears to be split on the merits of military intervention in Iran, but as of now Ahmari’s piece is the best I’ve read that articulates why the US should pursue diplomacy.
Thanks for taking the time to read. As always, I welcome your comments and questions.
Best,
Gabi