Issue 78: Syri-ous Change For The Better?
What does Assad's fall mean for the Middle East? Two clear opinions have emerged.
In the fast-paced world of Middle Eastern geopolitics, a part of me feels like a sloth for writing about Assad’s fall five days after rebel forces captured Damascus. However, I take comfort in knowing that most of the punditry that you may have heard on Syria this week will get it wrong; few, if any, anticipated the Assad regime falling in such dramatic fashion when it did.
I’ve identified two clear camps on Syria thus far. One camp argues that Syria’s fall is a transformative moment and the international community must support the designing of a “new” Syria. The other agrees that it is a transformative moment but urges caution, warning that the fall of Assad won’t likely end regional instability.
Both positions have merit. The end of the Assad regime should be celebrated. His predictable escape into the arms of Vladimir Putin enabled the liberation of thousands of Syrians from unspeakable suffering. It also promises the future reunification of families as well as potential national reconstruction. We shouldn’t require images like those coming from Seydnaya prison to remind us that dictatorial regimes are built on dehumanization, and yet the world’s attention shifted away from Syria’s pains to the point in which many forgot why Assad was so despicable in the first place.
Assad’s fall is a tremendous strategic loss for his two primary backers, Russia and Iran. I’m not sure whether this is a Berlin Wall or Velvet Revolution level moment, but it has presented an opportunity to roll back their regional influence in a significant way (just ask the Lebanese).
There have been some signs for optimism on the ground in Syria, such as displays of social unity (like interfaith gatherings and local agreements to suspend hostilities between warring factions), triggered no doubt by the news of Assad’s flight. Even though the country has been decimated by civil war, thousands of refugees eager to return home are already lining up on the Syrian border.
At the same time, more cautious voices argue that Syria’s road to recovery is paved with obstacles. Syria’s political factions were divided throughout the civil war (one of several reasons why the Assad regime endured so long) and have conflicting visions for the country’s future. A similar pattern exists within the international community, where - much to the detriment of the Syrian opposition and the Syrian people -diverging interests undermined efforts to topple Assad. Now that the common enemy is gone there is a heightened risk that the country’s factions (and their benefactors) return to violence, continuing to destabilize the region.
Complicating matters are legitimate concerns that Syrian military ordnance - in particular the chemical weapons stockpiles - may end up in the wrong hands.
One of the biggest questions is around the personality and competence of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, leader of the leading rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Jolani was previously affiliated with ISIS and al-Qaeda, and for this reason there is skepticism about his intensions and those of his partners. At the same time he appears to be trying to disassociate himself from his jihadist past, requesting that he be referred to by his given name, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Is he is capable of evolving from military commander to political figure within Syria? And what does that mean about the characteristics of a future Syrian government? I don’t know the answers, but here is a 2021 interview with PBS that serves a primer on the subject.
One thing is certain, the Syrian people deserve a better future. If they are going to have any chance at that, then they will both need a legitimate government and a cohesive international approach to Syria’s reconstruction (in particular, I’d keep an eye on how Middle Eastern states position themselves). Achieving both under the current geopolitical circumstances will be an uphill battle. But regardless of whether one adopts an optimistic or cautious approach, one cannot be complacent. We have not reached an end to history. Those who take action - preferably coordinated action in dialogue with international partners - will be able to create a new future, hopefully one where the Syrian people can live with dignity and mutual respect alongside their neighbors.
Three suggested pieces of content, amidst a flood of material that has come out in recent days:
Kareem Shaheen’s “Dawn in Damascus” in Newlines Magazine is a must-read Syrian perspective. Period. (As a side note, I think Newlines has done some of the best work on Syria over the years, but especially now.)
Aaron Zelin wrote the book on Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and is best positioned to comment on the organization, its role in the Syrian civil war, and what potential is in store for the country. Check out this conversation on the Conflict podcast:
The perspective from Israel is - as usual - nuanced. I’m confident that in the comings weeks/months I’ll write in greater detail on the strategic elements of the Israeli position (after all, I served on the Israeli-Syrian border for much of my time as a reservist), but I wanted to use this opportunity to share a piece by Diana Bletter for Times of Israel on the perspective of the Druze community of the Golan Heights, who have strong cultural and familiar ties to Syria.
Thanks for taking the time to read. As always, I welcome your comments and questions.
Best,
Gabi
1) De-listing HTS is one of the carrots that the US has at its disposal, but I assume that there will be a series of "tests" prior to making that kind of decision
2) I don't know exactly. I think they believed Assad could be "flipped" away from Iran. So now it is a question of how to project influence in a way that ensures a favorable outcome. And therein lies the challenge for Syrians - ensuring they get what they want when so many external interests will also be at play.
This is a great question. Many of the world's top policy experts (and senior government officials from the region) were gathered at the annual Doha Summit at the same time rebels were advancing on Damascus, and according to all reports the summit transformed from a pretty standard conference to a living breathing diplomatic event, so it caught literally everyone by surprise.
A few initial thoughts on your question. First, there was an overemphasis on the support Assad received from Russia and Iran over the years and not as much attention on how that support had faded during the course of the Ukraine war and the war between Israel and Iran's proxies. HTS and its backers perhaps sensed the regime's weakness more than others, but there is a chance they too were surprised. Two, regimes that have weak institutions are more susceptible to rapid collapse. The potential domino effect for senior military leadership to "turn it in" instead of fighting to the death is greater. So this is something I think needs to be explored more. Three, the policymaking community is small and there are times where it can be prone to groupthink. After over a decade of protracted conflict it is easy to understand why many felt like the current situation was unlikely to change so dramatically.